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The attraction of new industry is an ongoing  impacts.  Thus,  the  economic-demographic
concern for most local officials. Generally, local  impact must be allocated  to the local  area  of
officials  are  aware of the private  sector  bene-  interest to decision makers.
fits of new jobs and income. Attention is begin-  Second,  fiscal  impact  models  have  become
ning to be paid to secondary private sector im-  more sophisticated  in the  specification  of the
pacts  such  as  the  effect  of  new  industry  on  marginal costs  of public  service  delivery.  Use
local wage rates  and the problems  associated  of  per  capita  local  expenditures  is  being  re-
with  in-migration  of  labor  to  fill  new  jobs.  placed  by  engineering-economic  studies  and
Borts and Stein (Chapter  9)  give a  theoretical  behavioral  models  that  measure  marginal
discussion of these issues.  expenditures.  (See Borcherding and Deacon for
In  addition  researchers  and  policy  makers  a  behavioral model  and  Chalmers  and Ander-
are  interested  in  the  development  of  models  son  for  examples  of  engineering-economic
that estimate  the impact  of  new industry  on  analysis.)
local  government  expenditures  and revenues.  However, the fiscal impact models do not ap-
Many  computerized  versions  of  local  fiscal  pear to have the same emphasis on refinement
impact models are reviewed in a recently  pub-  of  the  tax  revenue  side  of  the  fiscal  impact
lished text (Burchell and Listokin,  pp.  345-59).  question.  For property  taxes,  a  common  pro-
The popularity  of these models is understand-  cedure is to make  a judgment (usually on cur-
able because of the potential benefits to be de-  rent  per  capita  values)  of  the  change  in  the
rived from accurate forecasts of local fiscal im-  value of the local property tax base. Per capita
pact. For example, a community can determine  values  of  the  current  property  tax  base  are
the magnitude of a tax incentive it can offer to  used with estimates  of the additional  popula-
industry  and  still  maintain  a  positive  fiscal  tion associated  with the new industry  to esti-
impact for local government.  Zoning laws  can  mate  the  secondary  additions  to  the  local
be written to encourage land use patterns that  property  tax  base.'  The  primary  addition  to
will  be  efficient  from  the  public  sector's  the local property tax base is determined from
perspective  if  the  public  expenditures  and  the firm's  estimate  of the capital value  of the
public  revenues  associated  with  alternative  new plant or equipment.  Finally,  local assess-
land  use patterns  can  be  predicted.  Finally,  ment ratios and millage rates are applied to the
local areas may be able to demonstrate to state  additional property tax base for the estimation
government  that a  large-scale  industrial  pro-  of property  tax  revenues  associated  with the
ject will benefit the fiscal position of the state  new industry  (Burchell and Listokin, pp.  179-
but be a burden to the local fiscal balance.  81).
The  development  of  fiscal  impact  models  Two sets of problems are involved in this per
during the past 15 years since the work of Low-  capita  approach.  One  set  of  problems  arise
enstein  and  Hirsch  has  followed  two  basic  from  the use of  current  average  tax  base  ef-
lines.  First,  the  economic  models  used  have  fects  when marginal or  "new"  average  effects
continued to range from simple economic base  would  be more appropriate.  The second set  of
to primary input-output models.  However,  the  problems stem from the use of the current tax
demographic  sector is clearly recognized in the  rate.
more recent  models  (see  Clayton;  Hertsgaard  The  secondary  tax  base  effects  of  new  in-
et al.).  These models  are becoming more com-  dustry depend  on a variety of factors,  some of
plex as they integrate  economic, demographic,  which are wage levels paid by the new industry,
and residential location components.  The need  local versus inmigrant labor requirements,  and
for this additional complexity is apparent from  interindustry effects.  Generally,  one would ex-
a  policy maker's  perspective.  A  municipal  or  pect  high wage  rates and  low import require-
county  decision  maker  is concerned  with  the  ments to result in large secondary  tax base ef-
fiscal impact of new industry on his or her com-  fects.  In addition,  if new  industry induced  in-
munity,  not  the  regional  (multicounty)  migration rather than utilizing available labor,
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'Secondary  additions  to the property tax base include residential and commercial  property, automobiles,  farm land, and other components  of the property tax base
aside from the value of the new plant itself.
193the secondary tax base effects would be large.  governmental  transfers,  and  local  borrowing
Conversely, new industry that pays low wages,  as shown in equation 2.
has large import requirements,  and uses local
labor would have relatively  low secondary  tax  (2)  E +  C = G  + T + BR +  GRS +  SSR
base effects.
These  generalizations  about  secondary  tax  where
base  effects  require  conceptual  and  expirical
testing. However, in this article we address the  G = grants-in-aid
set of problems  related  to use  of the  current  T = local taxes
tax  rate  and  therefore  proceed  as  though  BR = local  borrowing  for capital improve-
secondary  additions  to the property  tax base  ment
can be accurately  estimated. Accordingly,  the  GRS = federal  general revenue  sharing funds
new industry impact on the property tax base  SSR = state revenue shared with local gov-
is the sum of the value of the plant and equip-  ernment
ment  of  the new  firm (primary  addition)  and
the  secondary  addition  resulting  from  in-  The Gramlich approach treats the local gov-
creased employment and income in the region.  ernment  budget process  as one whereby local
If one now proceeds to estimate new proper-  preferences  are  expressed  for  public  service
ty tax  revenue  with  current  assessment  and  (via E  and C)  and for after tax income (Y-T).
millage  rates,  several  problems  will  be  en-  In addition, the budget constraint (equation 2)
countered.  When  the local  property  tax base  requires  that  local  revenues  equal  local  ex-
grows,  local  government  may  respond  by  penditure.  By using the  standard Lagrangian
lowering tax rates to generate the desired level  maximization  formulation  and  selecting  a
of tax revenues  (Penniman).  The desired  level  utility function that corresponds to the Gram-
of tax revenues  is the critical  variable  in the  lich model, one can form equation 3.
subsequent  decision  about the local  tax rate.  Inman (1979, pp. 274-5) notes two major ad-
The tax  revenue  decision  depends  on  the  de-  vantages  of this approach in comparison with
sired mix between public and private goods as  ad hoc approaches.  "First, the potential role of
perceived  by local governmental  units.  Conse-  Federal  and  Fiscal  policy  variables  can  be
quently,  use of  current tax rates  to estimate  clearly stipulated and specific hypotheses as to
property tax revenue from new industry over-  their  effects  on  local  choices  can  be  tested.
simplifies the tax estimation problem.  Second, because of legal requirements for a bal-
The purpose of this article  is to develop  an  anced  budget,  the  between  service  effects  of
alternative  framework  for  analyzing  the  service-specific  policies  can  be  explicitly  in-
property tax impact of new industry.  corporated  into  the  analysis  through  the
models imposed budget constraint."
THE  MODEL  The  following  constrained  utility  function
can  be  formed  with  the  usual  public  and
The  model  treats  tax-expenditure  behavior  private good arguments (Gramlich, p. 164).
of the local public sector as a problem of maxi-
mizing community welfare subject to a budget  (3)  U = a,  (E-aG-fSSR-(1-f)SSR-GRS)-a2
constraint (Gramlich). The objective in formu-  2
lating the model is to develop an equation for  (E-aG-PSSR-(1-fl)SSR-GRS)2 + a.aG -
estimating the impact of new industry on local
property tax rates.  a4 a2G2 + aPSSR - a6 3 2SSR 2 +
We start by defining the community welfare  2  2
function in equation 1.  a7(1-P)SSR  - a8 (1-p)2 SSR2 + agGRS -
(1)  U = U(Y,E,C)  al02 GRS2 + al  (Y-T) - a2 (Y-T) 2 + a13
2  2
where  (C-BR) - a4(C-BR)2 +
U = community welfare  A(E+C-G-BR-T-GRS-SSR)
Y = personal income of the community
E = local government operating expenditure  with the following parameter interpretations.
C = local government capital expenditure and
aU/Y > 0;  aU/aE  > 0;  a  U/  > 0  al, a2- the addition to community welfare
associated  with  a unit  increase  in
The budget constraint is formed by noting that  local  expenditure  from  own  local
operating  expenditures  and  capital  expendi-  sources.2 Note  that  G,  GRS,  and
tures must equal the total of local taxes, inter-  SSR are all nonlocal revenues  ar"
'Note that each variable's influence on the utility level, by the nature of this utility function,  is one where marginal utility of additional expenditures or incom1 94rst
rises, then falls. Thus, diminishing marginal utility of additional local expenditures is assumed after some level.
194E is total local expenditures.  Thus  icy variables,  E, T, and BR.
the difference  is  financed  by  local
sources of revenue.
a3, a  -reflect  the  influence  of  matched  (4)  aU/aE = a+a 2(E-aG - PSSR -
grants-in-aid  on  the  community  (1- P)SSR-GRS) + A  = 0
welfare where a is the legal matching
ratio of local and federal funds.  a U/a BR = a13+ a14 (C-BR) - A  = 0
a5, a  - represent  the impact of state-man-
dated expenditures financed by SSR  a U/aT = all  + a12Y-T) - = 0
transfers  on the  community welfare
where f represents the share of SSR  U/  A  = E + C - G -B  - T - GRS -
transfers that is tied to mandated  SSR = 0
functions.
a7, a8 - represent  the  additional  utility  This system of equations can now be solved
from  local  spending  financed  by  for two structural  equations for local taxes,  T,
state-shared  revenues  not dedicated  and local expenditures, E.
to some local function.
a9, alo - represent  the utility  of increments  (5)  E = bo + bG + b2T + b3GRS = b4SSR
of  GRS-financed  expenditures  by
local government.  (6)  T = cO+ clY + c2 [E-G-GRS-SSR]
all, a12- reflect  the utility of increments  of
local private expenditures  on com-  By substitution,  the reduced  form equations
munity welfare  with the (Y-T) term  are found.
measuring after tax income,  a proxy
for private expenditures.  (7)  T =  T1  + n11Y +  12G + 7113 GRS + T14 SSR
a13, a14-- represent  the  additional  utility
from local government  construction  (8)  E =  + n2 1Y + n22G + n23 GRS+  T 24 SSR
outlays net  of  current  borrowing.
The (C-BR) term implies that local  Equation 7 can be estimated by using ordinary
areas  "suffer  increasing  marginal  least squares although structural equation 6  is
disutility,  the  higher borrowing  is  unidentified.  If our only objective is to forecast
relative to their current construction  local property taxes,  we need not be concerned
(capital) outlays. The planning hori-  with  estimating  these  structural  parameters.
zon  for  construction  periods  is  However, our purpose is to evaluate the impact
longer than one period and they can  of new  industry  on local  property  taxes.  Ac-
be considered  as predetermined  for  cordingly,  we  consider  that  equation  7  indi-
the moment" (Gramlich, p.  164).  cates  the  relevant  explanatory  variables  for
A  is the Langrangian multiplier.  property  tax  variation  and  now  turn  our  at-
There is ample  reason  to believe that these  tention  to  local  property  tax  variation  in
parameters will differ in value. First, local deci-  response to new industry.
sion makers and their constituents are likely to
place  higher  values  on the  a1 parameter  than
the  a3,  a5, a7, or a9 parameters  because  a more  Property Tax Identity
immediate sacrifice is apparent in raising own-
source  revenues  than  in  financing  local  ex-  Local property taxes can be defined to equal
penditures  either  partially  with  other  funds  the product of the market value of the property
(i.e.,  matching  grant)  or  totally  with  other  (B),  the assessment  ratio (A),  and the millage
funds (GRS or SSR).3 rate (M). The effective tax rate = AM = RATE.
Second,  the all  and  a12 parameters  are  ex-
pected to be different from the others because  (9)  T = A xB xM
they  reflect  the  influence  of  private  expendi-
tures rather than public expenditures  on com-  The  A and M  variables  are the policy  tools
munity  welfare.  Finally,  a13  is likely  to differ  available to local  decision makers  in their de-
from the others in that it reflects both past and  termination  of  tax  rates.  These  local  policy
current  decisions  to provide  public capital  for  variables are influenced by changes in Y, GRS,
current and future residents of the community.  SSR, and G as suggested by equation 7. GRS,
If the levels  of C,  G,  Y,  SSR,  and GRS are  SSR, and G  tend to serve as substitutes  for A
given to the local community,  the utility prob-  or M (Penniman).4 Higher per capita income in-
lem  reduces  to the  maximization  of  the  con-  dicates an increase in demand for public goods
strained function with respect to the local pol-  and thus in the property tax levies required to
"Of course, rational individuals are aware that GRS, GRANTS, and SSR are paid partially from their own state and federal taxes. However, the "partial" nature of
these revenue sources for expenditures  implies less sacrifice than "own taxes."
'Wilde  (p. 87) describes  a wide range  of potential expenditure responses by local governments to intergovernmental  transfers depending  on  the type  of grant and
type of model used to assess the impact of the grant.  1
- q.0provide them. In addition to the behavorial  in-  tute  for  local  tax  rate  increases  because  the
fluences  on  the tax  rate,  the tax  identity  de-  negative coefficients of the GRANTS and SSR
fines  an inverse  relationship  between  the tax  variables  are statistically  significant  by the  t-
base and rate. The variables that influence the  test  criterion.  The  positive  and  significant
local tax rate are summarized in equation 10.  GRS  coefficient  appears  counterintuitive  if
GRS funds  are a  substitute for local  tax rate
(10)  RATE = F(G, GRS, SSR, B, Y)  increases.  There  are several  possible  explana-
tions  for this positive  coefficient.  First,  GRS
A property tax base  equation  could  also be  funds may be viewed as outside funds that are
developed.  However,  our concern is to test for  used  for  local  public  goods  that  would  not
variations in property tax rates in response to  otherwise  be  provided.  This  would  imply  a
changes in the exogenous variables in equation  neutral relationship  between the local tax rate
10 while holding the tax base constant.  and GRS transfers. However,  because the GRS
A  criticism  of  many  local  government  fi-  allocation formula is to some extent dependent
nance studies  is the use of aggregated  data of  on local  tax efforts,  this  coefficient may  indi-
states  and  various  local  governmental  units  cate that local officials  are aware of the incen-
(Inman, p. 273).  We avoid this problem by con-  tive to increase the local tax effort in order to
sidering  only  county  governments  in  South  obtain  increases  in  GRS  allocations.  Second,
Carolina.  However,  even at this level there are  there may be a statistical simultaneity bias be-
some  significant  data  problems.  Chief  among  cause  of  the relative  tax  effort  factor  in  the
them in our  study is the use of grant outlays  GRS  allocation  formula  for  county  govern-
data by county.  These grant outlays represent  ment. Accordingly, equations can be formed to
a mixture of matching grants aid with ceilings,  represent  this simutaneous  system.  Equation
open-ended  matching  aid,  and  specific  non-  12 is identical to equation 10.
matching  aids.  As noted  by  Wilde,  these  aid  (12)  RATE = F(B, SSR, GRS, GRANTS, Y)
forms may have different impacts on local gov-




Using  1977  data  for  all  46  South  Carolina
county  governments,  we estimated  rate equa-  SER = county employment in services
tion 10 by ordinary least squares in double log  MAN = county employment in manufacturing
form. 5 TRD = county employment in trade
Equation  13  is  derived  from the local  factors
Rate Equation  that determine GRS allocations to county gov-
ernment. 6 The potential  simultaneity bias can
(11)  logRATE=-2.26+.71  logY-1.37 log  be  eliminated  by  the  following  procedure.
(-2.5)(2.5)  (-3.7)  First,  solve  for  the  reduced  form  equations.
SSR-0.15 log GRANTS-0.90  Second, estimate the reduced form GRS values
(-2.0)  (-12.9)  and substitute  these values  into  equation  12.
log BASE/POP+0.90  log GRS  By this two-state least squares procedure,  the
(10.8)  following results are obtained.
where t-values are in parentheses (R2 = .90; F =
70.1).  (14)  Log GRS = 5.6-0.16 log MAN+0.003
(1.5)(-1.7)  (.01)
The parameter estimates of equation 11 yield  log TRD+0.13 log SER+1.03
interesting results.  First,  increases  in the per  (.76)  (3.5)
capita tax base yield reductions in the tax rate  log POP-0.41 log Y/POP
as  indicated  by  the  negative  and  significant  (-.81)
base coefficient,  ceteris paribus. This outcome  R2
=.84  F = 42.2
is expected from the property tax revenue iden-
tity.  Second,  as  hypothesized,  higher  income  (15)  Log RATE =-4.3+0.13 log GRS +.09  log
results  in  higher  tax  rates,  ceteris paribus.  (-2.4)(.29)  (.59)
County tax rates are found  to increase by  .71  GRANT-1.17 log SSR+1.04 log Y-0.92
percent for a 1 percent increase in income.  (-1.69)  (1.90)  (-6.92)
Third,  intergovernmental  transfers  to  log BASE/POP
county governments  in the form of grants and
state-shared  revenues  are  found  to  substi-  R2 =.65  F = 14.5
'Data  sources:  South Carolina Comptroller General,  Annual  Report, 1978. U.  S. Office of General Revenue Sharing, Tenth Period  Entitlements and Data  Element
Listing forLocal Areas; Federal  Outlays in South Carolina, 1977. Only county government functions were considered.  Thus, school district and municipal taxes were
not included.
•Total  GRS allocations are based primarily  on population, relative income, and local tax effort  (Stolz, p.  38). The employment variables serve as a proxy for the local
tax base and the RATE variable allows for variations in local tax effort.
196The results of equation  15 indicate GRS simul-  levels  result in higher tax rates.  The relation-
taneity bias  does exist and it alters individual  ship appears to be one of approximate unitary
parameter estimates. At the 10 percent level of  income  elasticity.  Alternatively,  if  the  tax
significance,  neither GRS nor GRANTS has a  base,  personal  income,  and other intergovern-
nonzero coefficient.7 However,  SSR, Y, and per  mental  transfers  are  held  constant,  the  local
capita base enter the equation with the expect-  property tax rate  is not  significantly  affected
ed signs and are statistically significant.  by GRS or GRANT revenues but is reduced by
The following conclusion can be drawn  from  increases in SSR revenues.
the empirical results. South Carolina local gov-  Finally,  the  relationship  between  new  in-
ernment  property  tax rates  are influenced  by  dustry and new local property tax revenues in-
variations  in the tax  base,  intergovernmental  volves  interdependencies  between  tax  base,
transfers,  and the demand for government  ser-  intergovernmental  transfers,  and  tax  rates.
vices  as expressed by county personal income.  Fiscal impact analysts who predict the change
If the tax  base  and  intergovernmental  trans-  in property  tax  revenues  from  new  industry
fers  are held constant, higher personal  income  need  to  capture  these  interdependencies  in
their modeling efforts.
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